The dominant forces in Syriza remain committed to the euro, but an increasingly powerful radical left has other ideas
In this crisis, we have already seen "zombie banks" and "zombie companies"; now Greece has a "zombie government". Before the elections, New Democracy and their coalition partners had pledged to renegotiate elements of the austerity programme outlined in the memorandum of understanding. Predictably, the Troika offered no compromise – having already made it clear that they would not renegotiate. Achieving some mitigation was the government's last chance. Now this cadaverous coalition is defunct, awaiting the day of internment.
So, where now for Syriza? The current Greek government, unstable as it is, is compelled to press ahead. But the left and labour militants have not experienced a significant defeat since the 1970s. This is a recipe for the escalation of a struggle that has included 17 general strikes since 2009, multiple waves of protest, occupations and the indignados. Three times last year, parliament was surrounded. And the radical left parties have all played a key role in organising these struggles.
The key slogan through which Syriza won support was its call for a government of left unity to express popular opposition to austerity. Amid a deepening nadir of European social democracy, and a protracted crisis of global capitalism, the issue of leftist governments is going to be a recurrent one. Syriza was the first of the European left parties (Die Linke, Fronte de Gauche, etc) to come near to taking office, but it is unlikely to be the last.
However, Syriza now finds itself in an ambiguous position. Having come close to forming a left government, the pressure will be on to establish its credentials with international lenders and EU leaders. But they must somehow do so without losing the support of the most radical workers. Already, before the election, there was a tendency to soften their stances; pledging to repeal the memorandum laws, but insisting that they would not act "unilaterally". These pressures will only increase in the coming months.
Yet, Syriza's stances will not emerge in a vacuum. Strategically, its trajectory will unfold within four key co-ordinates.
First, there is the eurozone itself. This world-historic achievement of European capitalism brought together 17 national markets into a union. But it was always a union characterised by uneven and combined development, with a dominant core and weaker states losing competitiveness and building up debt. As a consequence, the union is now bedevilled by crises from Italy to Spain. The outcome of each of these crises depends on the struggles between national elites and turbulent popular masses. And the EU's strength in these situations is not negligible. Even so, the weakness is systemic, and it will be a small miracle if the euro survives.
Second, there is the scale of the crisis in Greece. It is like Weimar combined with the Great Depression. Greece has been in recession for five years, and official unemployment is over 22%. Wages have fallen by 26% over the past 13 months and the economy will shrink by an estimated 6% this year. The state apparatus is crumbling. The government hopes to avert some of the political consequences by asset-stripping the state, which they claim will raise €19bn (£15bn) by 2015 and thus reduce the need for cuts. It is unlikely they will raise that sum. Every wave of austerity brings the day of Greece's bankruptcy forward.
Third, there are the mass movements in Greece. Here, the dominant trend, despite the rise of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, has been one of continued radical left advance, and accelerated union militancy. For example, the steel workers have been striking for months against a 40% pay cut and job losses. The employers took heart from New Democracy's victory and attempted to finally break the strike but failed. The resilience of such militancy will have an effect on how Syriza opposes. Already, the Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras is threatening to mobilise mass protests if the government proceeds with the first of its new privatisation measures.
Finally, there is Syriza itself, which is not just another social democratic party. It is a heterogeneous coalition, with an ecumenical approach to the left. Its dominant forces are reformist, but it has a far left wing, rooted in the social movements and is now looking to deepen its base in the unions. It has taken Pasok's place as the dominant electoral party among left workers.
Its major faultline, though, is the euro. Traditionally pro-European, Syriza had been developing a more critical stance – "not one sacrifice for the euro". In practice, this slogan was dropped before the election and the dominant forces in Syriza remain committed to the euro. The pressure brought to bear by the European leaders, reinforced by the material threats of capital flight and speculative attack, has much to do with this. The leftist forces in Syriza, who have been calling for a break with the eurozone, will have to fight for their position.
What happens to Syriza, whether and how it governs, will have a huge impact on the European left, and not just on Greece. For the European left, it is obvious that Greek workers should not have to pay for this crisis. It is not as obvious how this burden will be lifted.
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