N. SVERKOS: We have Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Katrougalos, in the studio with us, and of course he is also Syriza’s candidate for MP in the Northern District of Athens. Good morning, Mr. Katrougalos. G. KATROUGALOS: Good morning. Good morning to you and our listeners. Thank you for inviting me. N. SVERKOS: I think this interview, our meeting, is happening at the right time, because today we entering a new stage in Europe’s handling of Turkey's provocative actions – as they have been widely described – in the Southeastern Mediterranean, and of course its activities in the Cypriot EEZ. Today, the European leaders are expected to essentially ... we probably shouldn’t say “expected.” What can we anticipate today and tomorrow from the two-day proceedings of the European Council, with regard to Turkey? G. KATROUGALOS: The text of the European Council decisions has been prepared. This preparation is carried out in the General Affairs Council, and we know that, for the first time, we have a text that talks about measures against Turkey if it continues these illegal and provocative actions. In other words, this is a follow-up to what began with the European Council decision of March 2018, which for the first time characterized these actions on the part of Turkey as violating international law, and now a specific message is being sent – not just words, but actions – that there will be consequences if these tactics persist. At the highest level of the European Union, at the level of heads of state and government. N. SVERKOS: I think this is a positive development, at least from the point of view of the European Union’s readiness – which we don’t see too often – to make quick decisions on these things. G. KATROUGALOS: Decisions are usually made at a glacial pace in the European Union. The fact that this is a positive decision, a victory for Cypriot and Greek diplomacy – though we mustn’t gloat – is clear from the fact that as soon as the General Affairs Council decision was announced, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that decisions like this make the European Union a hostage of Greece and Cyprus. So our neighbour is obviously annoyed, which means Europe’s message was effective; it was received and understood. N. SVERKOS: The million-euro question is, will Turkey persist with these tactics? Of course, I don’t think it’s a question anyone can answer with certainty, so the question is this: Are we, as Greece, prepared to deal with any potential move on the part of Turkey? G. KATROUGALOS: That’s two questions. Will Turkey continue? As you say, no one can predict whether it will continue or not. But I can say with certainty that it will lose, not gain, if it continues. What has Turkey traditionally pursued? It follows what we call a revisionist policy. In other words, it disputes international law and tries, by projecting the power it has acquired as a regional power, to create various grey areas in terms of international law. Whether geographically or in terms of the other side’s rights.But when it is so isolated because of its actions – when everyone is condemning it for its illegal actions – it can no longer create loopholes in international law, precisely because it isn’t creating a dispute. Everything it does is being condemned, and each time it persists, it is condemned and isolated even more. So, if it continues for a certain amount of time, this means its isolation will increase and its standing in the international community will deteriorate further. As for whether we’re ready, I assume the question is what will happen if, after Cyprus, Turkey considers coming our way. N. SVERKOS: Or if it continues the same action ... Or if it launches a cycle of various provocative actions in general, like, for example, what’s happening right now. It happened a while back, I guess. The creation of a committee to look at whether it can open Famagusta, etc. G. KATROUGALOS: On a communication level such as that, it really can continue to create distractions. In reality, and although the infringement of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus is qualitatively different, even if there is drilling, even this exploratory drilling, in reality it isn’t aimed at commercial exploitation. Turkey knows that it can’t commercially exploit anything it finds. This is just part of the general effort, as I said, to create grey areas, to challenge the rights of the Republic of Cyprus. And in this Turkey has failed completely. With regard to our stance, we have sent multiple messages, and I think they have been received: That Turkey shouldn't even think about trying to shift this conduct into our waters. N. SVERKOS: I want to ask: You said, and I think it’s obvious, that Turkey is isolated on the international level. I want people to understand, and we want them to know what actions Greece has taken. In other words, did Greece contribute to this, or it is just by chance that right now we have a state of affairs where there is a game that is “beyond” us. G. KATROUGALOS: That’s a very good question, because I often hear the argument that Turkey’s isolation is due to its pulling away from the West. That it will get the S-400 system, and that this is causing it to clash with the superpower. There is that dimension. Turkey really is maintaining an ambiguous stance towards its international alliances. But the fact that the national positions of Greece and Cyprus have been strengthened is the result of our country’s systematic foreign policy. And I won’t talk about the general upgrading of our country’s international position, as a country that solves problems. The Prespa Agreement raised our country’s international standing considerably. I will talk specifically about what we did in Greek-Turkish relations and how we laid the groundwork for decisions like this. I already mentioned the European Council decision of March 2018, which was the first to condemn Turkey in specific terms for its illegal conduct. This was a watershed decision. If you compare it to the decision that followed the Imia crisis, which almost sparked a war, you can see that the European Council’s decision at that time tried to keep an equal distance. But in March 2018, precisely because of our systematic diplomatic preparation, Turkey was condemned for what it is doing as a power that violates international law. On the other hand, this week’s decision from the European Council comes on the heels of a very important summit meeting of the European South, the MED 7, the conclusions of which pointed to the necessity for sanctions against Turkey; that these sanctions need to be imposed by the European Union. And let’s not forget that this platform, the MED 7, the heads of state of the southern countries of the European Union, is one of the key achievements of our foreign policy. And consider which countries make up the MED 7: They include the second, third and fourth largest economies in the European Union. N. SVERKOS: France, Italy, Spain. G. KATROUGALOS: Exactly. So, everything we have achieved so far – and our achievements are considerable – has to be attributed to our government’s consistent foreign policy, which made Greece’s voice stronger and more respected. N. SVERKOS: I think that’s clear. But I also want to look at the issue of the Prespa Agreement. How much did the Prespa Agreement have to do with Turkey’s isolation? Not just in symbolic terms or in terms of enhancing our country’s diplomatic standing. On a substantial level, did it contribute to making our country stronger in relation to Turkey? G. KATROUGALOS: We shouldn’t see relations between states – especially on a bilateral level – as a zero-sum game. Every country has a position in the international community, and depending on how it conducts itself, it gains or doesn’t gain diplomatic standing. And this is not always directly related to a country’s size. Take the example of Norway. Norway’s population is similar to Greece’s, but because it consistently follows a policy of peace, it is a superpower in the rights sector. What did we want to do in our foreign policy? We wanted to send a message that we are not just a stable democracy, but that we also export stability. In other words, that with regard to all of the problems of our region, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, we are a positive factor for solving problems. How did we pursue this? In the Eastern Mediterranean, expanding the scope of our trilateral cooperation schemes. Cyprus and Greece are always at the core, and we have cooperation with Israel, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan. Our basic tool there was to create a positive agenda, topped by energy, and this is precisely why the greatest achievement on the scale of these actions was the EastMed, a pipeline that is of great political as well as economic importance. And the United States was invited to the announcement of the initiation of the pipeline’s construction. This is symbolically important because it shows exactly the policy of stability that the United States sees: that this policy gets results. Similarly, in the Balkans, we supported the European perspectives of all the countries, on the condition, of course, that they meet their obligations – whether we’re talking about European obligations or, in the case of Albania, those that concern the Greek National Minority – and obviously we wanted to send a message that we can resolve disputes in a mutually beneficial manner, as with the Prespa Agreement. You cannot imagine how much the Prespa Agreement improved and reaffirmed our country’s image as a country that solves problems. So I don’t think there can be any doubt that our country’s position in the international community became much stronger after this agreement.
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