I thank His Beatitude for inviting me to come to Cyprus and set out my thoughts, my debt to Cyprus. Orthodoxy was always a religion, a faith, with an ecumenical voice, forced, under the Ottoman empire, to fragment into national churches and disseminate its theological message through the struggle for national revival. This is why Orthodox patriotism was always, at the same time, ecumenical. Many people, trapped in a western mindset, wonder how the Church can be patriotic in a way that is compatible with political patriotism, even a leftist’s patriotism. Those who wonder are making (in my opinion) two mistakes. They sometimes have trouble grasping the patriotic struggle, and they identify it with rampant nationalism, what we call chauvinism. Patriotism is completely different from chauvinism. Patriotism is part of the citizen's identity, as is his religious sentiment. The struggle for this identity is an integral part of what we call the cultural struggle. The "culture wars" are an integral part of the great social struggles and strife, mainly in 19th century Germany and in the U.S. during the 20th century. Today they are present everywhere. Patriotism is about defending the space where the citizen's day-to-day life is safeguarded; where there is pride in the achievements of the community to which he belongs. It is the continuation and creative development of civilisation, of the principles and values that are the foundation of a national entity organized into a political entity, more often than not as a state. In contrast, chauvinism is the false sense of the superiority of the race, the tribe, to which one belongs, over the culture and identity of another. If patriotism is a positive outlook on the self, chauvinism is the denial and rejection of the other, of difference. The most extreme form of chauvinism is racism, hatred of what is different. Every patriot must draw a line against such phenomena and mindsets. I deeply believe it to be a mistaken view that – in the name of the struggle for the homeland, culture, history, traditions – shows tolerance for extreme nationalism. Just as it is profoundly counterproductive and dangerous to reject patriotism in a well-meaning desire to counter chauvinism. Greece and Cyprus belong to Western and European civilisation. They are producers of this civilisation; gave birth to it. They were part of the great democratic ancient Greek culture. Torches that lighted the path of history. They were the West, but not just the West. They were the crossroads that produced culture that influenced the East and the West. They were the melting pot recasting the cultures that came from the east and the south. In the age of feudalism and the creation of great territorial and maritime empires, this position they had as productive crossroads evolved into a crossroads of great geostrategic importance. Greece suffered the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and Cyprus both the territorial Ottoman empire and the more recent British maritime empire. I want to underscore this self-evident historical reality, because as much as we are linked by multiple ties to the West, we are not exactly the same as its states. Two thirds of them were agents and practitioners of colonialism. But we weren't. So we not only have no reason to apologize, with the rest of the west, for the crimes of colonialism, but at the same time we mustn't forget that we were victims of colonial empires. By extension, based on international law, on the morality of the age of the creation of nation states – the belief in common principles and values – and even on current metaphysical and religious morality, we do not owe them, but they owe us. And it is proper – their debt – that they should refrain from exercising real or, even more so, non-existent rights over Cyprus and Greece. That they should refrain from behaving arrogantly towards us and, much more, from exercising any form of violence. Unlike in 1821 and 1960, Greece and Cyprus are no longer states that are being formed. They are strong, independent states, members of many of the greatest organizations of today's world. States that contribute, along with all of the EU, to shaping the policy on Turkey's accession to the EU, on strengthening the regime of the Turkey-EU customs union, as well as on the UK's withdrawal from the EU. We are now judges, and not the judged. We share in the decision making on the highest national/state interests of third countries, as do the states I mentioned. With regard to the latter, in particular – with the negotiations on the fulfilment of their aspirations to start soon – I will state my assessment publicly: Their stance on us, and on the Cyprus issue, will significantly impact our future choices. In the current age, they cannot invoke ties, rights, demands from a bygone era when Greece and Cyprus were still their colonies. That is why we are waiting for everyone to show us the requisite respect. The requisite respect for the principles of international law and the sense of justice and equity. Greece was one of the first regions of great empires that pursued and, through persistent struggle, won its national independence. Long before the great empires collapsed. With its revolution of national liberation, which is considered to have begun on 25 March 1821, it showed peoples that there needs to be unity in the soul, desire in the mind and heart, with resolve. Any lack of the above qualities, in the form of civil conflict – brother against brother – or less enthusiastic philhellenism, which was vital to the success of the revolution, jeopardised the Revolution itself. The price was very high: collapse of the country, indebtedness, high borrowing costs throughout the history of the modern Greek state. The history of the Greek revolution continued with the expansion of the Greek state and the inclusion of more and more regions that were historically Greek and where the majority of the population was Greek. When Greece stopped discerning its integration into a state from expansion into foreign spaces, it was led into the Asia Minor catastrophe. When it moved towards conducting itself in the manner of the states that had territorial empires, it was defeated and surrendered its rights. In the end, its geographical extension and the expansion of its population remained incomplete. This had been preceded by another mistaken choice on the part of Greece's ruling class: The refusal, in 1914, to join the Alliance of powers fighting the Austro-German Central Powers. When, in exchange for this participation – or at least concession of Greek rights over an Ionian island – Great Britain offered the unification of colonized Cyprus with Greece. Greece participated in World War I in the end, after 1916, but without the considerations of 1914. The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the misstep of 1914 were the result of one-sided orientations of the country's dominant forces toward specific alliances and dependencies. Today we know that Greece is part of the West, but at the same time it is a bridge between the East and the West. We know that it needs to have a multidimensional and proactive democratic foreign policy with a plethora of initiatives. That it needs to bear the international balance of power in mind and not ignore the aspirations and desires of others. We know that, as Greeks, we need to develop our capabilities – capacities, I call them – for understanding the current problems, for formulating alternative solutions and always implementing the best possible solution. The Second World War was catalytic. It ushered in the age of the end of empires, including maritime empires, such as Britain's. The fight to resolve the national issue was linked with the social issue. The armed combat of peoples with mass movements demanding solutions to day-to-day and structural problems. The struggle for self-determination with the inclusion of the rights of smaller communities and minorities. Wherever this combination did not occur, long-term problems took shape; problems impacting a number of states to this day. After the Second World War, thanks to the struggle of citizens and mass movements, history once again put the Cyprus issue on the Agenda. As a problem of liberation and, at the same time, regulation of state and social relations. It is a fact that the sense of historical continuity played an important role in Cypriots' self-consciousness. On the other hand, the inclinations of the Turkish Cypriots and the ways in which they might collaborate in the struggle for self-determination were not borne adequately in mind, and the Turkish factor was sometimes overestimated, and at other times underestimated. Unilateral perspectives led to problems with the Turkish Cypriot community, which utilised the British factor with "exceeding skill". Turkey and certain Turkish Cypriot leaders were "incorporated" with great ease into the British plans for instigating opposition between the two communities of Cyprus. The British made Turkey a player again in a game in which the latter had officially and "irreversibly" renounced (then and only then) any rights with regard to Cyprus. The foreign player, as in 19th century Greece, intensified the domestic strife in Cyprus. They capitalised on every mistake made by the self-determination movement. They tried to transform the Cyprus issue from a matter of self-determination, social justice and national liberation into a matter of relations within Cyprus. They treated the island's swelling liberation movement harshly. They tortured and killed members of the struggle who chose, starting on 1 April 1955, to resist by every means, including armed means, pointing up the courage, self-sacrifice and tragic end of a number of heroes of the Cypriot struggle. In 1956, they banned AKEL, thus pointing up the link between the movement for the liberation of Cyprus and the social issue, the issues of democracy, equality and freedom. The Cyprus problem became an issue at the UN and was internationalised. The mistakes that were made gave a "foothold" to London, which endeavoured: - to involve Turkey as a "third player" in the Cyprus issue, - to impose itself as the promoter of the "castrated independence" of the Cypriot republic, and - to make Turkey once again a player on and within the Cyprus issue. Neither of the two – Turkey or the UK – wanted a fully independent democratic Cyprus. At the same time, in Greece – as among the Greek Cypriots – there was self-deception as to the role of the UN. The old colonial powers, rather than the emerging world of independence and the liberation movement, were still dominant within the UN. Our side expected a great deal more from the UN than what the UN could actually give. At that time, too, the UN proved necessary to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. But it did not lead automatically and in every case to a just and functional solution. On the Cyprus issue, there often wasn't a clear assessment of the international balance of power at a given time or the geopolitical changes arising from the balance of power. Turkey's weaknesses and capabilities were not accurately assessed. Whereas the British plans for the utilisation and involvement of Turkey in any resolution of the Cyprus issue were underestimated. The chain of events is well known. The founding of the Republic of Cyprus was accompanied by two Treaties that were anything but helpful: the treaty of guarantee, and the treaty of alliance. When the junta yes-men decided to depose Makarios in the name of unification, but in reality to serve the interests of third parties, the Cypriot state entered upon a course of great anguish. I would like, Your Beatitude, Dear Mr. President, To apologize on behalf of all of us, here in this special place, for the crimes of the junta of Athens. Today, the Cyprus problem is one of the most complex problems of international politics. Multiple players are involved, with different and often conflicting objectives. The Cyprus problem includes multiple and multi-level problems: the social and intercommunal issues, the issues of history. But from the perspective of international relations and international law, the Cyprus problem is first and foremost a problem of the occupation of Cyprus by a foreign army. Turkey's armed and violent intervention in Cyprus, on the pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriots, violated the treaties of London and Zurich. It was and is illegal. Is violated the UN Charter and all of the rules and provisions of international law. The Turkish intervention uprooted thousands of Cypriots from their homes. It made refugees of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots and forced the Turkish Cypriots to live under a de facto military regime. The majority of the latter were forced to leave Cyprus. Turkey put more and more pressure on them through its military presence and through transporting settlers to the eastern region, making life unbearable for the Turkish Cypriots. This fact is not covered up by Turkey's public demand for the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, in no way is Turkey prepared to give similar rights to all of its own populations. Essentially, Ankara is not interested in the Turkish Cypriots, but in securing its own geostrategic "rights". In contrast with Turkey, Greece is not involving itself in the negotiations on the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem, because it fully respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Whatever opinion we might have on these aspects of the negotiations, we never stated them, publicly or privately. Our respect for the Republic of Cyprus is absolute and unmitigated. Greece involved itself in the Cyprus issue via the assistance it provided towards Cyprus's accession to the EU. Together with the late Giannos Kranidiotis, we fought for Cyprus's accession to the EU. After the 1997 veto in Luxembourg, we – Greece and the other members of the EU – moved towards the honest and progressive compromise of Tampere, in the fall of 1999, which took shape in the Helsinki decisions and the opening of Cyprus's path to European accession. Today, Greece is involved in the external/international aspect of the negotiations on the Cyprus problem. Regarding the two aforementioned Treaties in which, for better or for worse, it participated and has undertaken international commitments and responsibilities. In this context, the international aspect of the Cyprus issue is made up of three interrelated problems: the system of guarantees, the supposed third-party rights of intervention in Cyprus, the presence of foreign troops on Cyprus. As soon as the new government of Greece came into office in January 2015, we immediately informed the UN and every international player involved in the Cyprus issue that our position is that this system and these treaties should be abolished, with no ifs or buts. And this is because such a system is illegal according to current international law and all of the UN resolutions. Because this system was used to employ violence – and armed violence, at that – which international law prohibits. Because it is an anachronistic system that does not reflect the realities of the Republic of Cyprus. Many sides tried to keep the issues of the guarantees and rights of intervention in Cyprus from being put on the agenda of the Cyprus negotiations. This was also clear in Geneva. Turkey was not in a position, or did not want, to make any proposal. Perhaps it had been caught up in the delusion that we don't mean what we say. But we mean it, and we mean it categorically. Because how can you say you are solving a problem when you want to leave the problem's substance and foundation intact? It is no coincidence that, following the first day of talks in Geneva, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that he had supposedly more important things to do than discuss the Cyprus problem, saying he had to go to Ankara due to the election campaign and the developments in Syria. In this way, he refused to stay for the second day of the talks. Subsequently, consciously lying, he stated that we left Geneva, while we were still there with the UN Secretary General. The main thing, of course, is that the Turks left Geneva because they didn't want to, or couldn't, discuss what is, from an international perspective, the core of the Cyprus problem: the elimination of guarantees and of any potential for intervention, and the withdrawal of the occupation army. It was obvious that, the day after the Geneva talks, they were looking for an excuse to divert the negotiations to other issues. They are now very well aware that they cannot convince anyone in the world that they have the right to a military presence, or to intervene, in Cyprus. That is why they chose a win-win option: to raise new, irrelevant issues in order to cover for their inability or unwillingness to discuss the main issue, or, in the best case, to gain the potential to control Cyprus through non-military means, in order to compromise on other issues. This is how we got to the demand concerning the "four freedoms" for the Turks. Simultaneously, people in institutional positions in occupied Cyprus, like the pseudo-prime minister, referred to a 'plan B' and the potential for Turkey's annexing occupied Cyprus. Others in occupied Cyprus talked about a "Gibraltar model". It is remarkable that the international players, who are so sensitive on other issues, act as if they didn't hear any of that. The Turks demands for the four freedoms do not concern the Cyprus problem. It is a demand being made to the EU in the name of the Cyprus problem. In reality, that is, Turkey is demanding that those involved in the Cyprus issue take care to satisfy the aforementioned demands if they want to see the Cyprus problem resolved. Thus, once again, Turkey is trying to cover up the issue of the Occupation and promote its own rights as a supposed central issue of the Cyprus problem. It does this by asking, on the one hand, for a military base – for reasons that have to do with the Middle East issue – and, on the other hand, for the "four freedoms", which have to do with the rights of Turks in the EU. Personally, after Geneva, I expected the Turks to raise irrelevant issues as a form of leverage. They didn't surprise me. I was more impressed by the conduct of the international mediator. What did this mediator do? Did he, perhaps, instead of mediating between the two communities, proclaim himself mediator between Turkey and the EU? I ask myself, does he have such a mandate, and from whom? If Turkey wants something from the EU, Turkey should go to the EU and negotiate for it. They will be welcome. But the others have no business believing that, because of the Cyprus issue, they are obliged to contribute to satisfying Turkey's demands, which have to do with its relations with the EU. And I ask myself, did they undertake to resolve the Cyprus problem following the violations of the previous agreements, or did they undertake the better implementation of the old agreements and their most pro-Turkish interpretation? Is it perhaps advocacy, rather than mediation, when they undertake to explain to them how to best phrase their demands to the EU? Are they perhaps functioning as lobbyists in the service of Turkey? In closing, Greece's struggle in the 19th century and the Cypriot struggle for self-determination in the 20th century did not take place to serve the interests of third parties. These were struggles for independence and sovereignty. So that our peoples could live in peace and not in slavery. Today, Greece supports every choice made by Cyprus concerning the internal aspect of the negotiations on the Cyprus problem. Greece supports a Cyprus not controlled by foreign armies, outdated systems of guarantees, any kind of external guarantees from the invaders. Prohibition of any third-party intervention or any infringement of international law or use of violence in international relations, wherever that violence may come from. Greece supports the granting of rights to the three minorities (Maronites, Armenians, Latins). The maximum possible rights for the Turkish Cypriots, so that they too can dream of Cyprus as their homeland, their children's homeland, far from injustices and foreign interventions. The maximum security for the Greek Cypriots, in a unified and creative Homeland. Thank you.
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